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Abstract
Climate change is a central topic of concern for EU international diplomacy and is the site of increased politicization glob-
ally. Concomitantly, a parallel process of parliamentarization of the EU has unfolded. Whilst the European Parliament (EP)
has enjoyed significant powers in internal policy-making on climate change, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
in 2009 the EP has gained the right to veto the EU’s ratification of international (climate change) agreements. This devel-
opment raises questions about our understanding of the EP as an actor in international climate diplomacy that this article
addresses through the following research question: What impact have the increased powers of the EP had on its involve-
ment in UN climate diplomacy?We analyze the EP’s evolving role in international climate diplomacy through an evaluation
of its policy preferences prior to international climate conferences (COPs) and its activities during those meetings. We find
evidence that the EP’s preferences have become more moderate over time, and that it is also more active at COPs and
increasingly engaged with a range of more important actors. However, we find little evidence that the EP’s involvement
in international negotiations is significantly different when it holds a veto power, which we attribute to a willingness to
depoliticize internal EU climate negotiations to secure policy gains at the international level.
Keywords
climate change; climate diplomacy; Conference of the Parties; European Parliament; European Union; parliamentarization;
parliamentary diplomacy; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Out of the Shadows, Into the Limelight: Parliaments and Politicisation”, edited by Christine
Neuhold (Maastricht University, The Netherlands) and Guri Rosén (University of Oslo, Norway).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The European Parliament (EP) has gradually become
an important and influential actor in shaping the EU’s
internal climate policies. Acting as an environmental
champion, it has pushed the EU’s green agenda and
strengthened its legislation (Burns, 2013; Judge, 1992).
Interestingly, it has had historically limited formal pow-
ers in the external policy-making arena of international
climate diplomacy, a highly politicized policy field where
the EU has profiled itself as a leader (Burns, 2017; Burns
& Carter, 2010; Delreux, 2011). However, whilst the for-
mal powers of the EP have grown with the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 there has been limited
attention paid to the parliamentarization of the EU’s in-
ternational climate diplomacy (Biedenkopf, 2015, being a
notable exception). For example, a recent thematic issue
of this journal on the 2015 Paris climate conference has
no specific discussion of the EP (Hovi & Skodvin, 2016)
and an article focused upon the EU’s position (Schreurs,
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2016) makes only passing reference to the Parliament.
This article addresses this lacuna in our knowledge by
investigating the EP’s involvement in international cli-
mate diplomacy through a systematic evaluation of its
expressed policy preferences prior to United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Conference of the Parties’ (COP) meetings and its activ-
ities during those COPs. In doing so we contribute to
the literatures on the parliamentarization of external EU
policy-making, the rational choice institutionalist schol-
arship on the empowerment of the EP, works on inter-
national climate diplomacy and we contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of how the politicization of climate
change at the international level has shaped the EP’s po-
sitioning on the issue.
The Lisbon Treaty introduced the right for the EP to
veto the ratification ofmost international agreements, in-
cluding climate treaties. The EP has used its ex post veto
power to reject the Anti-Counterfeiting TradeAgreement
(ACTA) and the Society forWorldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT) Agreement (Monar, 2010;
Ripoll Servent, 2014). Given this new power we ask:
What impact have the increased powers of the EP had
on its involvement in UN climate diplomacy?Weexamine
that involvement by analyzing the activities of the EP be-
fore (ex ante) and during (ad locum) international climate
negotiations. Before the negotiations, the EP adopts res-
olutions in which it signals its preferred outcomes for
the international negotiations. During the negotiations,
a delegation of Members of the EP (MEPs) attends the
negotiations and conducts its own diplomatic activities.
We develop two expectations on the EP’s ex ante and
ad locum involvement. First, we anticipate that the EP’s
involvement has evolved over time, in the sense that:
(a) the EP’s expressed preferences have converged with
those of the Council; and (b) it has becomediplomatically
more active. Second, we expect that both the ex ante
and the ad locum involvement depend on whether the
EP has a veto power. Assuming that the ex post veto will
cast its shadow on ex ante and ad locum involvement,
we envisage that the EP’s preferences will be closer to
the Council’s and the EP delegation will be more active
when the intended outcome of the international negoti-
ations is a legally binding treaty (where the EP’s ex post
consent is required) than when the intended outcome is
not a treaty (andwhere there is no consent requirement).
Overall, we suggest that the increased politicization of
climate change around such legally binding treaties is a
crucial part of the explanation for the EP’s conduct.
To develop our argument, we examine the
Parliament’s involvement in the EU’s climate diplomacy
at the annual COPs of the UNFCCC between 2007 and
2017. In the following Section 2 we review the literature
on the EP’s powers and involvement in the EU’s exter-
nal relations, before deriving four expectations. We then
analyze the resolutions adopted by the EP before the
international negotiations (Section 3) and the activities
of the EP delegation during the negotiations (Section 4).
We conclude in Section 5 that whilst there is evidence
that the EP has converged with the Council over time
it has simultaneously become more active at COPs and
increasingly engaged with a range of more important ac-
tors. We find limited evidence that the EP’s behaviour is
different when it holds a veto power.
2. The EP’s Empowerment in EU External Relations and
Involvement in International Negotiations
In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty introduced two key powers
for the EP in the field of external affairs that have con-
tributed to the parliamentarization of EU climate diplo-
macy, and challenged the traditional executive domi-
nance of this policy area. First, the EP’s consent is now
required for the EU’s ratification of most legally bind-
ing international agreements, i.e., treaties (EU, 2012,
Art. 218§6). Therefore, the EP has no veto power over
international negotiations that do not have treaty sta-
tus, such as ‘normal’ COP decisions. Since 2009, the con-
sent procedure applies to agreements in fields covered
by the ordinary legislative procedure, including climate
change. Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,
the Parliament was only involved through consultation
in the ratification process, and therefore did not enjoy
an ex post veto power (Delreux, 2011).
Second, the EP ‘shall be immediately and fully
informed at all stages of the procedure’ (EU, 2012,
Art. 218§10). As the Treaty does not specify how the
EP should be informed, a number of Interinstitutional
Agreements (IIAs) have been adopted in order to clar-
ify inter-institutional relations, most notably by requir-
ing that the EP be informed and consulted on all in-
ternational treaty negotiations (Thym, 2008). The EP’s
information right is achieved through giving access to
documents about the negotiations and through allowing
MEPs to attend international meetings in a so-called ‘EP
delegation’ (Urban, 2018). However, there is no formal
role for the EP in drafting the EU position for interna-
tional negotiations, which remains the prerogative of the
Council. Nevertheless in a broad range of external policy
fields, the EP regularly adopts resolutions in order to put
issues on the agenda (Ripoll Servent, 2018), to influence
the official EU position (Jančić, 2016) and to signal its
preferences—and the range of agreements that will be
acceptable in the ratification stage—to the Council and
the Commission, as well as to third actors.
Although the EP’s most straightforward formal power
is limited to an ex post veto power, the EP has long been
‘rather successful in maximizing its influence through
informal decision-making’ (Van Hecke & Wolfs, 2015,
p. 303), both in the stages of ex ante and ad locum in-
volvement. Interestingly, the rising parliamentarization of
the EU’s external relations has not been strongly opposed
by EU negotiators. The recognition of the EP by the other
institutions has been driven by both legitimacy concerns
(Rosén, 2015) and the wish to strengthen the EU’s nego-
tiation position at the international level (Rosén, 2016).
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This discussion leads us to expect that the empower-
ment of the EPwill have two types of effect on its ex ante
and ad locum involvement in international climate nego-
tiations: a changing involvement over time; and an am-
plified impact in the context of COPs where the consent
procedure applies for the ratification of an international
climate treaty.
A first set of expectations is that the increased pow-
ers of the EP will make the EP’s stated policy preferences
less ambitious and its involvementmore active over time.
Several studies suggest that the empowerment of the EP
has coincided with growing political efforts to increase
its international prestige and visibility (Raffaelli, 2013;
Stavridis & Irrera, 2015) and with more influence on the
EU’s external policies, both in CFSP (Riddervold & Rosén,
2015; Rosén & Raube, 2018) and in trade (Meissner,
2016; Van den Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2015). We antici-
pate that the EP’s expanding powers and increasing pres-
tige manifest themselves in its involvement before and
during COP negotiations.
Regarding the content of the resolutions and the EP’s
ex ante involvement, studies on the evolution of the EP
in internal EU environmental policy-making have demon-
strated that the policy positions adopted by the EP be-
comemore moderate once the EP has secured increases
in power (Burns, Carter, Davies, & Worsfold, 2013).
Analyzing the EP’s amendments over different policy-
making procedures and over time Burns and Carter
(2010; also see Burns et al., 2013) find that as the EP’s
powers increased through the extension of the ordinary
legislative procedure the environmental ambition of the
EP’s amendments declined, but the Parliament’s success
in securing the adoption of its amendments increased.
There are a number of reasons for this development.
First, as the EP’s powers have increased it has become
more able to secure its policy preferences. A standard
tactic used by the EP when the institution had more lim-
ited legislative influence was to adopt highly ambitious
amendments knowing they were unlikely to be accepted
by the Council. The purpose of such amendments var-
ied: it could be to express a policy preference and shape
future agendas; or they could serve as an opening gam-
bit in a legislative negotiation in which the EP would be
prepared to weaken its demand as the process unfolded
(Burns & Carter, 2010). The advent of the ordinary leg-
islative procedure and the EP’s ability to reject legisla-
tion has made this behaviour less relevant. In addition,
the Council and EP have much greater informal and for-
mal contact with each other and can discuss their prefer-
ences more openly. There is also scope for anticipatory
compliance on the part of the Council and Commission
where they toomightmoderate their positions to accom-
modate the EP’s preferences (Ripoll Servent, 2013, 2018).
We expect that this general trend of convergence will
also apply to external climate policy, as a result of which
the EP is likely to adopt positions that aremore similar to
the official EU position determined by the Council, which
in turn may also be taking into account the likely policy
positions of the EP and amending its own position, es-
pecially where the EP has a veto. This trend is likely to
be reinforced by the EP’s wish to be recognized as a sig-
nificant diplomatic actor. This leads us to expect that the
EP’s stated preferences aremore likely to be further away
from the Council when it has less power, and that the
Council and EP preferences converge when the EP has
greater power and responsibility in the field of external
relations. Hence, we expect that:
E1a. The ex ante expressed policy positions of the EP
will converge with the Council’s positions over time.
The EP’s empowerment is also likely to affect the EP’s
ad locum involvement, i.e., the activities of the MEPs at-
tending the international negotiations, over time. We ex-
pect that it will increase the level of activity of the EP
delegation attending the COPs and that the number of
activities byMEPs sur placewill growwhen the EP has ac-
quiredmore powers. Additionally, the nature of the activ-
ities and the actors to whom the EP delegation reaches
out is likely to change. We expect the EP delegation to
conduct more diplomatic activities with third actors who
really matter in international negotiations, i.e., govern-
mental representatives. Hence, we expect that:
E1b. The number of activities of the EP delegation will
grow over time and the nature of its interlocutors will
change.
A second set of expectations is that the anticipated ef-
fects discussed above are amplified when the intended
outcome of a COP is legally binding. This distinction be-
tween legally binding and non-legally binding outcomes
of COPs matters as the EP only has formal ex post veto
power on legally binding outcomes. Of the 11 COPs
falling in the scope of our study, three were expected to
lead to a legally binding outcome:
• COP 15 (Copenhagen, 2009): although COP 15 did
not result in a treaty but only an ‘accord’, it was
reasonable to expect that the consent procedure
would be applicable to the Copenhagen outcome
as a legally binding outcome was expected in the
run-up to the COP (Earth Negotiations Bulletin,
2015);
• COP 18 (Doha, 2012): resulted in the ‘Doha
Amendment’, a treaty establishing the second
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The
Council adopted a decision on the ratification of
the Doha Amendment in July 2015 after having re-
ceived the consent of the EP in June 2015;
• COP 21 (Paris, 2015): where the Paris Agreement
was agreed. The Paris Agreement was ratified by
the Council in October 2016, one day after having
received the EP’s consent. While we recognize the
difference between the substantive scope of the
Doha Amendment and the Paris Agreement, both
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COP outcomes are legally binding, which makes it
likely that the ‘shadow of the consent procedure’
affected the EP involvement.
One reason for this expectation relates to the politi-
cization of the wider climate change agenda. Climate
change has become increasingly politicized inmany parts
of the world, especially in the US (McCright & Dunlap,
2011). The politicization of climate change internation-
ally generated more polarization on the issue (De Wilde,
2011), which has had paradoxical effects. In order to se-
cure support for the climate agenda, one reaction has
been to seek to depoliticize the issue by fostering so-
cial consensus and public engagement (Pepermans &
Maeseele, 2016). In the EU, the issue of climate change
has generally led to less polarization than in the US and
other states such as Australia and Canada, nevertheless
the rise of right-wing euro-sceptic parties that tend to
be climate-sceptic has challenged the broad consensus
(Carter, 2018). When a COP is expected to lead to a bind-
ing treaty, we therefore expect a higher level of politi-
cization and a greater scope for disagreement at the in-
ternational level, which puts more pressure upon the EU
institutions to present a united front to secure EU pol-
icy preferences. In other words, politicization of climate
change internationally leads to moves to depoliticize the
issue across the EU’s institutions. Hence, we expect that:
E2a. The shadow of consent is likely to lead to in-
creased convergence between the EP’s preferences
and those of the Council for COPs that intend to pro-
duce a climate treaty.
Regarding ad locum involvement, the backwards shadow
that the Parliament’s veto can cast along the policy-
making process may lead other EU actors to engage in
anticipatory compliance in order to avoid the likelihood
of the EP exercising its veto (Dür, 2006; Ripoll Servent,
2014). The Parliament has rarely used its veto and ismost
likely to do so either as a matter of principle (to remind
the Council that it enjoys such powers and should not
be ignored) or because its preferences significantly di-
verge from those of the Council. Both of these condi-
tions pertained in the case of the ACTA and SWIFT ve-
toes. The EP felt it had been excluded from discussions
so was prepared to use its veto to remind the Council
that it was a key institutional player that could not be
ignored (Monar, 2010; Ripoll Servent, 2014). Moreover,
in the case of SWIFT the EP was concerned about the
implications of the agreement for EU citizens and their
data and in the case of ACTA it was concerned over pri-
vacy and internet freedom. In both cases the agreements
were designed to establish new international regulatory
regimes that had direct implications for EU citizens and
their freedom and personal data. By contrast, when it
comes to international climate diplomacy, the interna-
tional climate regime has been in place since 1997 and
the Council and EP are both committed to international
climate policy and share similar goals. It consequently
seems unlikely in this case that the EP’s and Council’s
preferences would be so far apart that the EP would be
prepared to reject EU ratification of an international cli-
mate treaty that the Council has accepted. It is possible,
and more likely, that the EP would be prepared to re-
ject a climate treaty if it felt that its prerogatives and
signals have been ignored by the other EU institutions.
Therefore, in order to avoid the exercise of an ex post
veto, the Council and the Commission have an incentive
to involve the EP during the negotiations (Biedenkopf,
2015;Monar, 2010; Onderco, 2018). This includes, on the
one hand, organizing more direct contacts between the
EU negotiators and the EP delegation, whereby the EU
negotiators can transmit the pressures from the interna-
tional negotiators to the EU’s veto players who do not
experience these pressures directly (Delreux, 2011), and,
on the other hand, allowing the EP delegation to reach
out to more actors, and notably to executive actors from
third parties.
Similarly, in COPs where the outcome will be subject
to the consent procedure, we also expect an intensifi-
cation of the number of briefings from the Commission
and the Council to the EP delegation towards the end of
the two-week COP meeting. It is at the end of the nego-
tiations that the EU negotiators will be forced to make
concessions that might be difficult to accept for the veto-
players. Hence, the EU negotiators will have the incen-
tive to involve the EP delegation at thatmoment, in order
to check whether certain concessions are acceptable, to
make sure that the EP understands the difficulties faced
by the EUnegotiators, and ultimately to assure the accep-
tance of the final deal by the EP (Delreux & Kerremans,
2010). Consequently:
E2b. The shadow of consent is likely to affect the num-
ber, nature, and intensity of the EP’s activities in its ad
locum involvement.
3. Ex ante Involvement: EP Resolutions
In order to determine the EP’s preferences and their
proximity to the Council we reviewed all EP resolutions
and Council conclusions adopted prior to the COPs from
2007 to 2017 (the EP did not adopt a resolution in 2008
for COP 14 in Poznan). The COPs are typically held in
November or December. The EP resolutions are debated
and drafted in parallel with the Council developing its po-
sition but the EP tends to formally adopt its opinion a
month ahead of the Council. We coded the resolutions
and conclusions allowing key themes to emerge from the
text. Hence, all the EP resolutions and Council conclu-
sionswere read through to determine the themes emerg-
ing from the text. Those themes were listed and then
the documents were uploaded to a qualitative compar-
ative software tool. The software was used to carry out
a word count analysis, to find key phrases associated
with the themes identified and to determine if any other
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key phrases emerged from the documents that the ini-
tial analysis had missed or overstated. Then each docu-
ment was coded line by line to see whether and how key
phrases were used. It is important to note that the num-
ber of times a phrase is used is only one indicator as a key
theme can be mentioned only once whilst nevertheless
still being important.
Figure 1 indicates nine core themes, the number of
times they are mentioned by both institutions, and the
relative attention the Council and the EP attach to each
theme. Hence, Figure 1 allows a comparison between
the EP and the Council in absolute terms—and an intra-
institutional comparison of EP resolutions and Council
conclusions in relative terms. It shows that, in relative
terms, the Council conclusions paymore attention tomit-
igation than the EP resolutions, whereas forestry, tech-
nology and transport are mentioned more frequently in
EP resolutions than in Council conclusions. Figure 1 also
indicates that the EP generally tends to mention the is-
sues it cares aboutmore than the Council—reflecting the
fact that the EP’s resolutions generally tend to be longer
and less focused. Council resolutions are more legalistic
and tightly framed. For instance, prior to the Bali COP in
2007, the Parliament chose to emphasize ‘themoral obli-
gation on industrialized countries to provide increased fi-
nancial and capacity building support for risk reduction
and adaptation to climate change’ (EP, 2007), which is
the kind of language that the Council typically eschews
and certainly this statement of morality is not mirrored
in any of the Council conclusions.
Hence, a first kind of difference that emerges be-
tween the Council and Parliament concerns the way in
which topics are discussed. For example, on climate fi-
nance, an on-going issue in climate change diplomacy,
the EP has consistently called for any climate finance pro-
vided by the EU to be additional to official development
assistance (ODA). The EP resolution and the Council con-
clusions ahead of the Copenhagen Conference reveal a
significant difference between the EP and Council in lan-
guage and positioning (see Table 1). The Council calls
for all ODA to incorporate climate change considerations
and for synergies to be sought between climate change
and ODA goals, which could undermine the pursuit of
genuine additionality in ODA as called for by the EP.
A second kind of difference is that, in contrast to
the Council, the EP makes several calls for EU leadership
and unity. Following COP 15 in Copenhagen, which was
largely regarded as a failure for the EU, the EP identified
the lack of EU unity as a reason for that failed leader-
ship and urged the Council to speak with ‘one voice’ (EP,
2010a). EU unity became a key theme for the EP from
2009–2015 (EP, 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
2015), but it disappeared from the resolutions for the
2016 Marrakech and 2017 Bonn COPs (EP, 2016, 2017).
This finding suggests that the ‘one voice’ rhetorical de-
vice was used to shore up a united EU front in the run
up to a COP intended to result in a legal treaty (COP 21 in
Paris), but since then has no longer been regarded as nec-
essary. Another theme that appears in EP resolutions but
not in Council conclusions is the Parliament’s call to be in-
cluded in the daily EU coordination meetings during the
COPs—a request that has yet to be accepted. However, a
shift in wording appeared in 2015, the year of the Paris
COP 21 that led to an international agreement, where
the EP states that ‘as it will also need to give its consent to
any international agreement that it needs to be well inte-
grated into the EU delegation’ and ‘expects therefore to
be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings in Paris’
(EP, 2015). Similar wording is used in the resolutions for
theMarrakech (EP, 2016) and Bonn (EP, 2017) COPs. Here
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Figure 1. Core themes mentioned in Council conclusions and EP resolutions prior to the COP.
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Table 1. Positions on Climate Finance in EP and Council Resolutions in preparation of COP 15 in Copenhagen.
EP Council
Insists that such commitments to provide for the required
predictable financial support for climate change
mitigation and adaptation in the context of the UNFCCC
must be new and additional to ODA and independent
from annual budgetary procedures in the Member States;
recalls that the resources should be distributed not as
concessional loans, but as grants; recalls the
already-existing commitments, aimed at achieving ODA
levels of 0,7% of Gross Domestic Product by 2015.
STRESSES that all ODA expenditure should take climate
considerations into account with a view to making it
climate-proof; EMPHASISES that synergies in the
implementation of international climate finance and other
assistance in developing countries should be used as
much as possible, that the experience of existing
institutions, including multilateral and bilateral
development financial institutions, in delivering aid in
developing countries should be used and the agreed
principles of aid effectiveness should be applied.
Sources: EP (2009) and Council of the EU (2009).
we see a shift from a request to be included in coordina-
tionmeetings to an expectation from the Parliament that
given its legal role that it will be included.
Turning to the evolution of the proximity between
the EP and the Council preferences, our analysis reveals
an increasing similarity between the EP’s and Council’s
positions. This is particularly the case for the mitigation
theme. The positions on the other core themes are also
largely similar, but are characterized by differences in
tone and framing.
For example, on forestry, whilst the EP and Council
both make the link between financing and combatting
deforestation, the EP’s resolutions are different in tone.
Ahead of COP 21 the EP called on the EU to scale up in-
ternational finance to combat deforestation (EP, 2015),
whereas the Council does not use such wording and
is mainly concerned with monitoring and verification
(Council of the EU, 2015). Both institutions pay less at-
tention to forestry from 2013 onwards with the Council
failing to mention it from then on.
Likewise, on technology, because of the central role
of technology in the clean development mechanism,
much of the difference between the EP and Council
stems from the association with finance and develop-
ment, and the on-going development of renewables. In
its Copenhagen resolution the EP was keen to ensure
that developed countries do not use offsets instead of
transferring technology to poorer countries (EP, 2009).
The EP also called upon the EU ahead of COP 16 in
Cancun (2010), to establish a leadership position in its
own investment in clean technologies to set a good ex-
ample for others (EP, 2010b). Prior to Durban (2011) the
EP called for investment in ‘appropriate technologies’ (EP,
2011) and in its Paris resolution (2015) called for the
removal of subsidies for fossil-fuel based technologies
(EP, 2015). The Council though tends to emphasize na-
tional measures to encourage technology deployment
and noted in its Poznan (2008) resolution that the EU sup-
ports the establishment of carbon capture and storage
demonstration projects (Council of the EU, 2008). Across
all these core themes—finance, forestry, technology—
the two share broad policy preferences and the princi-
pal differences between the EP and Council tend to be
less about substance but more about framing with the
EP pushing the Council—and thus the EU as an interna-
tional actor—to be more ambitious and to take a leader-
ship role.
When it comes to mitigation and targets the EP and
Council were initially further apart and the EP has con-
verged more obviously with the Council. From 2007 to
2013, although they were agreed on the overall direc-
tion of policy, there was a discrepancy in the targets
they advocated. The Council committed to a 30% reduc-
tion in greenhouse gas emissions if other UNFCCC par-
ticipants agree to the same target, by contrast the EP
called for 30% without conditions. However, from 2013
onwards the institutions’ expressed preferences on tar-
gets became identical.
Generally speaking then for the period 2007–2017
the expressed policy positions of the two institutions
have been fairly consistent, especially on themost impor-
tant core theme of mitigation since the failure to achieve
a treaty at Copenhagen. Hence, we find some evidence
(particularly on mitigation) that the EP’s positions con-
verge with the Council’s over time and that the former
become more moderate (E1a). However, there is no par-
ticular shift in at COPs 15, 18 and 21 when the shadow of
consent was present (E2a).
4. Ad Locum Involvement: EP Delegations
The EP has sent a delegation to every COP of the UNFCCC
since the early 1990s. The EP delegation generally at-
tends the second week of the COP. In the period un-
der study, the EP delegation varied between 11 and 28
members, apart from the politicized outlier case COP
15 with 48 MEPs attending. In most cases, all political
groups have at least one MEP in the delegation. The
MEPs are accompanied by EP staff, mostly from the sec-
retariat of the EP Committee on Environment, Public
Health and Food Safety and EP Committee on Industry,
Research and Energy, and the EP’s Directorate-General
for Communication, by an agent per political group, and
sometimes by assistants to an individual MEP. During
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the COPs, the EP delegation holds meetings with EU ac-
tors who participate in the multilateral negotiations and
with non-EU actors (our analysis is based on the ‘sum-
mary notes’ or ‘mission reports’ detailing the activities
of the EP delegation, including a precise hour-by-hour
programme). The meetings with the EU negotiators take
the form of briefings. The number of briefings with the
EU negotiators—Commission, Council Presidency, lead
negotiator—is presented in Figure 2. As MEPs do not
have direct access to most of the negotiation rooms as
they are not allowed to participate in the daily EU co-
ordination meetings (see above), these briefings are of
crucial importance for them to get up-to-date about the
developments in the COP negotiations.
Although the trend is neither systematic nor linear,
the EP delegation now receives more briefings from the
EU negotiators than a decade ago (E1b). By contrast,
we do not find strong evidence supporting the expec-
tation E2b that more briefings are organized when the
COP’s outcome is intended to be legally binding. On the
one hand, indicating support for our ‘shadow of con-
sent’ expectation, most briefings were indeed organized
at COP 21 (which resulted in a legally binding outcome)
and there were also more briefings at COP 15 than at
the preceding and subsequent COPs. On the other hand,
suggesting a rejection of the expectation, the number of
briefings at COP 21 rather fits within the growing num-
ber of briefings over time than within a pattern related
to the degree towhich the outcome is binding.Moreover,
we do not see a higher number of briefings at COP 18 (al-
though the Doha Amendment was legally binding). Also,
COP 17, with a high number of briefings but without a
legally binding outcome, challenges the expectation.
We also expected that the number of briefings would
intensify towards the end of a COP meeting in case that
COP meeting was intended to result in a legally binding
agreement (E2b). Figure 3 presents the number of brief-
ings per day at each COP. For a confirmation of our expec-
tation, we should observe a pattern with an intensifica-
tion of the number of briefings towards the end of COPs
15, 18 and 21 than in other COPs. Yet, the empirical data
do not provide evidence for this expectation.
Instead, what we see since COP 17 is an emerging
standard practice of organizing one or twobriefings a day.
Particularly at COP 20 in Lima (2014), a practice seems
to be institutionalized to organize two briefings per day.
After the daily EU coordination meeting that takes place
in the morning, the rotating Presidency briefs the MEPs
on the state of play in the negotiations and on the dis-
cussions in the EU coordination meeting (which was
chaired by the Presidency). The second briefing is given
by the Commission. It takes place in the evening to dis-
cuss the progress made during the day (and sometimes
the prospect of the upcoming all-night negotiations).
Evidently, the contacts between the MEPs and the EU
negotiators are not limited to these reported briefings.
Informal talks with representatives of the Commission,
the Presidency and other member states undoubtedly
occur in the corridors of the negotiations and particularly
in the ‘EU Pavilion’, where the EU’s offices are housed
during the COP (andwhere the EP has its ownoffice since
COP 15).
The second kind of interlocutors of the EP delegation
sur place are non-EU actors. Figure 4 presents the evolu-
tion in the number of ad locum outreach activities by the
EP delegation. Examining with whom the EP delegation
meets at the COP venues reveals a number of interest-
ing observations.
First, with the exception of COP 18, the number
of meetings with representatives of international or-
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ganizations has been relatively stable. On average,
approximately half of the EP delegation’s meetings
with non-EU actors are with representatives of inter-
governmental organizations that deal with climate-
related issues, both within the UN framework (e.g.,
United Nations Environment Programme, Food and
Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development
Programme, Global Environment Facility, International
Energy Agency, World Health Organization, International
Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime
Organization) and outside the UN framework (e.g.,
Council of Europe and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development).
Second, at every COP, meetings are held with parlia-
mentary delegations from third countries, which show a
constant pattern over the years. With the exception of
COP 19, the MEPs usually meet with counterparts from
3 to 7 other countries. With a number of these parlia-
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mentary delegations—particularly from the US, Brazil,
Japan, South Korea, Mexico and South Africa—meetings
are rather common.
Third, a recent development, particularly since
COP 18, is that the EP delegation also meets increas-
inglywith governmental representatives from third coun-
tries. For instance, at COP 23, the EP delegationmet with
ministers (or in some cases heads of delegations) from
Russia, the US, Brazil, Japan, China, India and Australia,
as well as the chief negotiator of the Alliance of Small
Island States. This shows that the EP’s ad locum involve-
ment is becoming more mature as it increasingly focuses
its outreach activities on the actors who actually con-
duct international negotiations—governments, not par-
liaments. Hence, rather than an evolution in the number
of meetings with third country actors, it is the kind of in-
terlocutor that recently started to strengthen the EP’s ad
locum involvement in UN climate negotiations (E1b).
5. Conclusions
This article sought to answer the following research ques-
tion: what impact have the increased powers of the EP
had on its involvement in UN climate diplomacy? We
find evidence to support the claims that the expressed
positions of the EP have grown closer to the Councils’
over time (E1a) and that the EP has become more active
and increasingly interacts with governmental represen-
tatives during the negotiations, thereby presenting itself
as a maturing actor in the EU’s climate diplomacy (E1b).
However, we do not find support for the shadow of con-
sent affecting the EP’s positions or its activities at COPs.
The ex ante preferences of the EP are not closer to the
Council’s in COPs expected to lead to a legally binding
treaty (E2a). Likewise, the number, nature and intensity
of the EP delegation’s ad locum activities do not signif-
icantly differ between the Copenhagen, Doha and Paris
COPs and COPs that are not characterized by a shadow
of consent (E2b).
There are a number of ways of interpreting these
findings. First, the backward shadow of consent operates
across more than one COP. UNFCCC climate negotiations
are rather a continuous process than a sequence of sep-
arate, annual meetings. In other words, the consent pro-
cedure does not cast its shadow on individual COPs, but
rather on a multi-year negotiation process culminating
in a COP where a treaty is ultimately adopted. Second,
the EP and Council share broadly similar preferences on
climate change making the EP unlikely to use its veto.
Here we suggest that the politicization of climate change
at the global level has increased the perceived need for
unity at EU level as evinced by the one-voice rhetorical
device post-Copenhagen that sought to depoliticize the
issue to reduce conflict amongst the EU’s institutions,
thereby signaling the EU’s unity of purpose to external
actors (also see Schreurs, 2016). Third, and relatedly, we
see the EP seeking to be a reliable partner with a de-
sire to secure a progressive international climate deal, in
linewith the traditional approach of the EP (Burns, 2017).
The ACTA and SWIFT rejections imply that where the EP
feels it has been ignored or excluded, and where there
is potentially direct impact of agreements upon citizens’
rights the patterns of behaviour may be different. Hence
the impacts of parliamentarization and politicization are
likely to vary between policy fields. Comparing the EP’s
involvement in international negotiations across a range
of policies may reveal different patterns and is thus a
promising future research agenda.
Our findings also have implications for our under-
standing of the role parliaments can play in international
negotiations, a relatively understudied topic. It was be-
yond the scope of this article to investigate the impli-
cations of the parliamentary preferences and activities.
A future project could investigate whether the participa-
tion of parliamentarians in international negotiations re-
sult in changes in the way other actors behave, and/or
in the substantive content of international agreements.
Likewise, the EP’s impact on the outcomeof international
negotiations, as well as the possible use of the EP delega-
tion by the Commission and the Council as part of the
overall EU climate diplomacy arrangement are interest-
ing questions to be examined in future research on the
role of the EP in the EU’s external relations. Overall our
article demonstrates that the relationship between for-
mal parliamentary empowerment and actual behaviour
is complex and only through systematic careful analysis
can we uncover patterns in parliamentary involvement.
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